From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays, Second Revised Edition

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Epistemology Naturalized" in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press: 69–90. At Harvard, Quine helped supervise the Harvard graduate theses of, among others, David Lewis, Gilbert Harman, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Hao Wang, Hugues LeBlanc, Henry Hiz and George Myro. For the academic year 1964–1965, Quine was a fellow on the faculty in the Center for Advanced Studies at Wesleyan University. [21] In 1980

As previously reported, in other occasions Quine used the term "neurology" instead of "empirical psychology". [31] How can we talk about Pegasus? To what does the word 'Pegasus' refer? If our answer is, 'Something', then we seem to believe in mystical entities; if our answer is, 'nothing', then we seem to talk about nothing and what sense can be made of this? Certainly when we said that Pegasus was a mythological winged horse we make sense, and moreover we speak the truth! If we speak the truth, this must be truth about something. So we cannot be speaking of nothing.Methods of Logic. The four editions of this book resulted from a more advanced undergraduate course in logic Quine taught from the end of World War II until his 1978 retirement. A. Open with a hook, something to keep the reader interested enough to read until the conclusion (known as exordium) There’s no one right way to structure an argumentative essay; it depends on your topic, opposing viewpoints, and the readers, among other things. In fact, to accommodate different types of argumentative essay styles, three methods have emerged as the go-to formats: Classical (Aristotelian), Rogerian, and Toulmin, explained below. Quine, W. V. (1961). From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays, Second Revised Edition. Harper torchbooks. Harvard University Press. pp.22–23, 28. ISBN 978-0-674-32351-3.

Grattan-Guinness, Ivor, 2000. The Search for Mathematical Roots 1870–1940. Princeton University Press. Willard Van Orman Quine ( / k w aɪ n/; known to his friends as "Van"; [9] June 25, 1908 – December 25, 2000) was an American philosopher and logician in the analytic tradition, recognized as "one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century". [10] He served as the Edgar Pierce Chair of Philosophy at Harvard University from 1956 to 1978.Naturalism in Epistemology". Naturalized Epistemology. stanford.edu. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2017. The Toulmin method is a deep analysis of a single argument. Given its methodical and detailed nature, it works best for breaking down a complicated thesis into digestible portions. Quine resists the temptation to say that non-referring terms are meaningless for reasons made clear above. Instead he tells us that we must first determine whether our terms refer or not before we know the proper way to understand them. However, Czesław Lejewski criticizes this belief for reducing the matter to empirical discovery when it seems we should have a formal distinction between referring and non-referring terms or elements of our domain. Lejewski writes further: Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes", Journal of Philosophy 53. Reprinted in his 1976 Ways of Paradox. Harvard Univ. Press: 185–196. Lejewski then goes on to offer a description of free logic, which he claims accommodates an answer to the problem.

Most of Quine's original work in formal logic from 1960 onwards was on variants of his predicate functor logic, one of several ways that have been proposed for doing logic without quantifiers. For a comprehensive treatment of predicate functor logic and its history, see Quine (1976). For an introduction, see ch.45 of his Methods of Logic. New Foundations, abstract objects, indeterminacy of translation ( holophrastic indeterminacy, inscrutability of reference, ontological relativity, gavagai), radical translation, referential transparency, naturalized epistemology, meta-ontology, ontological/ ideological commitment, [7] natural kind, semantic ascent, Quine's paradox, Duhem–Quine thesis, Quine–Putnam indispensability thesis, semantic holism ( confirmation holism, web of belief, hold come what may), extensionalism, problem of empty names, propositional attitude, two dogmas of empiricism, principle of charity, cognitive synonymy, observational statement, mathematical quasi-empiricism, Quine–McCluskey algorithm, Quine–Morse set theory, vivid designator, predicate functor logic, Quine quotation, Quine corners, Quine atom, Plato's beard, existential generalization and universal instantiation, veridical vs. falsidical paradoxes [8]Frost-Arnold, Greg (2013). Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science. Chicago: Open Court. p.89. ISBN 9780812698374. This volume of essays has a unity and bears throughout the imprint of Quine's powerful and original mind. It is written with the felicity in the choice of words which makes everything that Quine writes a pleasure to read, and which ranks him among the best contemporary writers on abstract subjects." ( Cambridge Review)

Concatenation as a basis for arithmetic". Reprinted in his Selected Logic Papers. Harvard Univ. Press.Quine grew up in Akron, Ohio, where he lived with his parents and older brother Robert Cloyd. His father, Cloyd Robert, [14] was a manufacturing entrepreneur (founder of the Akron Equipment Company, which produced tire molds) [14] and his mother, Harriett E., was a schoolteacher and later a housewife. [9] Quine was an atheist when he was a teenager. [15] Education [ edit ] Colleague Hilary Putnam called Quine's indeterminacy of translation thesis "the most fascinating and the most discussed philosophical argument since Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories". [33] The central theses underlying it are ontological relativity and the related doctrine of confirmation holism. The premise of confirmation holism is that all theories (and the propositions derived from them) are under-determined by empirical data (data, sensory-data, evidence); although some theories are not justifiable, failing to fit with the data or being unworkably complex, there are many equally justifiable alternatives. While the Greeks' assumption that (unobservable) Homeric gods exist is false, and our supposition of (unobservable) electromagnetic waves is true, both are to be justified solely by their ability to explain our observations.